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ABSTRACT

GRAFTING DEMOCRACY: BRITISH POLICY
IN THE BURMA INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

Kylan Rutherford
Economics Department
Bachelor of Science

This thesis investigates—through a case study of the independence process in
Burma—what, if any, specific policies the British established and followed in granting
independence to their former colonies. The author investigates the development of
institutions in the first Burma constitution through primary source documents. Statements
of policy found indicate that the British strove to create a policy of protection and
representation of minorities, encouragement of democracy mirroring Western
constitutions, and a desire to establish stability in the region and preserve self-interests.
Documents indicate a large disparity between policy and practice. The author concludes
that this disparity is caused primarily by economic and political constraints and a
prioritization of domestic economic policy, not an absence of colonial policy.
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I. Introduction
In almost every discussion on the modern economic and political progress of
developing nations, colonialism is brought up. For centuries global powers conquered,
controlled, and cut up regions in the global south. Colonial administrations aggravated
ethnic tensions to “divide and rule,” restructured economies to maximize resource
extraction, and imposed laws and restrictions to maintain power and export domestic
goods. At the height of the colonial era, essentially every aspect of a colony was
exploited for the home country’s benefit. The British empire in particular at one time
controlled about a fourth of Earth’s land area. The people of these areas were subject to
the monarch of England and expected to loyally and proudly serve the throne without
many of the benefits enjoyed by true Englishmen.
Over a period of about two centuries, Britain gradually relinquished its colonies,
changing from ruler to government-crafter. England has been called “the mother of
parliaments,”1 a nod to the role it has played in establishing a democratic parliamentary
system in most of its over 60 former colonies. Under colonial rule, British Victorian
culture, dress, and education were imposed on the colonies; the British way of life was
marketed as the ideal for all of her subjects and it appears that British form of
government was no exception.
However, it is striking how diverse the governments of former British colonies
actually are in spite of British self-endorsement. The systems and institutions created by
the British resemble each other in core democratic principles but are dissimilar in many

1

A phrase coined by British politician John Bright in 1865
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critical aspects including electoral rules, parliamentary structures and duties, minority
protections, and enduring relationships with England.
With these differences in mind it becomes difficult to discern what, if any,
consistent policy the British employed in decolonization. There have been moments
where Britain has explicitly stated colonial policy.2 Some common themes in these
statements include goals for peaceful multi-racial pluralism, constitutional safeguards,
and eventual self-government within The Commonwealth of Nations.3 However, these
statements become problematic when compared to the disparate policies enacted in
practice, and the resulting institutions created in individual colonies.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson conducted research on the impact of colonial
institutions on the colony’s future economic performance.4 They find that colonies where
extractive institutions were set up continue to have poorer economic success. On the
other hand, colonies where “better” institutions were formed —defined as protections of
property rights and checks on government power—appear to have more successful
economies. Their later research reaffirms this finding, adding the observation that these
institutions appear to not just slightly impact, but in some cases even reverse economic
growth trends.5

2

Examples include British Colonial Policy in Africa, 1959, United Kingdom, House of Commons 1947,
November 5, and Burma Statement of Policy by His Majesty’s Government, May 1945. Available at The
National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey. Reference: Cabinet Registry.
3
The Commonwealth of Nations, or more often just The Commonwealth is an intergovernmental
organization composed mainly of countries formerly part of the British Empire. In 1947 The
Commonwealth served as a way of securing preferential trade even under post-war free trade
agreements, and as a network of general political cooperation. Members during this period were referred
to as having “Dominion Status” rather than being independent nations.
4
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001.
5
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002.
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Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson suggest that disease and European mortality
rate in regions during the colonial period greatly influenced the level of settlement and
thus the institutions formed. While this observed correlation is valid and leverageable as a
statistical instrument for the general type of institutions formed, it does not completely
answer why colonizers, in this case the British, chose the specific institutions that they
did. Burma and India, for example, share similar climates and diseases, yet they were
governed with very different institutions, both before and after independence. Why the
difference?
Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini have contributed extensive empirical
analysis on the impact of institutions on a variety of aspects of a country, including fiscal
policy and economic performance.6 These scholars have at their disposal data and
statistical tools which equip them to analyze causality empirically and thus express
informed policy recommendations. During the independence period, the British did not
have access to this information, but they do appear to operate with prior beliefs on what
institutions provide the best outcomes. This thesis will attempt to understand why the
British made the decisions that they did with the limited information that they did have. It
would be anachronistic to hold the British accountable to the knowledge that is currently
available. It is instead more insightful to seek to understand what they knew, and how
they responded to that knowledge. Primary source documents and correspondence enable
that understanding.
This paper seeks to better understand the creation of institutions through a case
study of Burma’s independence process. The author acknowledges the limitations of this

6
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case study, and the findings presented in this research have limited applicability to other
former colonies. However, it opens a detailed window into the underlying process of
forming institutions, and as such this thesis provides a foundation for future research on
this topic.
Burma provides a valuable case study because of when its independence took
place. A defining period of development for British colonial policy occurred after World
War II. By the end of the ward Britain had lost her prestigious global status and her
ability to maintain a global empire, accelerating an already significant momentum toward
independence for several British colonies. With the fade of her global hegemony, colonial
nationalist movements and economic strain tested Britain’s dedication to her ideals.
Under these pressures, the independence processes in Burma shows to what extent the
British will consciously promulgate their fundamental principles, the limitations of their
resolve, and the gap between their rhetoric and actions.
This thesis investigates the design of government institutions in former British
colonies through the lens of stated British policy, proposing a theory for the disparity
between policy and practice. The author argues that there is limited evidence for a
consistent British policy; instead, economic and political self-interests and conditions
drove the creation of institutions. The discourse will center on one case, namely the
independence process in Burma.
The thesis will proceed as follows: Section II will give a brief history of Burma,
with a focus on individuals and events that have a particular impact on the independence
period. Sections III-V look at three aspects British policy: protection of minorities,
majoritarian democracy, and strategic self-interests and stability. Each aspect is examined

4

through the lens of the expressed British policy, showing the disparities between policy
and practice. In the context of these three aspects, the author argues—with support from
primary-source, archival documents—that these disparities are a function of the political
and economic situation in Britain rather than an established and consistent policy. Section
VI concludes.

II. Historical Background
Burma has a complex political history prior to and during British rule. The
Irrawaddy valley, the central plains area in Burma, has been home to several dynasties
and kingdoms, controlling to varying degrees the surrounding tribes, sometimes as
vassals and sometimes as formal subjects. Often these subjects included the diverse
ethnic groups in the northern “frontier areas.” Traditionally, the Burmese kings allowed
chieftains in provincial areas to continue to rule their own states even after incorporation
into the kingdom.7
The power of Burmese monarchs fluctuated. Some dynasties administered only
fractions of the region; others built mighty kingdoms, extending their borders into Siam
and China. The last kingdom of Burma was centered in Mandalay and led by King
Thibaw Min. The British conquered Burma in three phases, moving from the coast north
into the Irrawaddy valley and ultimately up into The Frontier Areas. Thibaw abdicated
and was led into exile during the second phase of British conquest, essentially ending
formal resistance to the British aside from skirmishes in The Frontier Areas.8 Some
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Burma Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry Report, 1947
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regions of Burma were never formally subject to British rule. Similar to the earlier
Burmese policy, the British allowed tribes in the borders of their territory to maintain a
degree of autonomy.
Burma was administered as part of British India until The Burma Act of 1935
(which went into effect in 1937) when it was separated and became its own, separate
colony. Between separation from India and World War II, one set of elections were held
in November 1936. These elections generated a government with more Burmese
representation, but still lacked real indigenous autonomy. There were no cohesive or
particularly distinct parties and even the Burmese majority lacked unity. The elected
government succeeded in passing several measures (mostly agrarian acts) and leaders
were generally willing to work toward more autonomy in a constitutional manner.9 At
this period, it seemed that Burma was on a trajectory for a peaceful attainment of
Dominion status. The Thakin Party, composed of several significant national leaders
including Aung San, sought for more rapid movement toward complete independence,
not Dominion status, but at this point their opinion represented a small minority.
World War II halted all progress toward autonomy. In an attempt to circumvent
the British and grasp independence, Aung San and a small group of Thakin Party
members secretly traveled to Japan to receive military training. They entered Burma with
Japanese forces and rallied nationalists behind the Japanese. They succeeded, the British
were forced to retreat, and Burma was annexed by the Japanese. Sentiment was different
in the Frontier Areas; according to a May 1945 statement from the British Government,
“throughout the whole of the two Burma campaigns, and the intervening period,
those of the hill peoples with whom we were able to maintain contact have shown
9

Burma Statement of Policy by His Majesty’s Government, May 1945. Available at The National Archives,
Kew, Richmond, Surrey. Reference: Cabinet Registry.
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outstanding and spontaneous loyalty and have fought hard against the Japanese
both as guerillas and as levies and members of the regular armed forces.”10
The Japanese did not allow Burma and its leaders the freedom promised, and quickly
began oppressing the “Free Burma Administrations” set up by Aung San and his forces.
Disillusioned by the Japanese, as the tide of the war turned Aung San again switched
sides and worked with the British to undermine Japanese control and take back the
colony.
World War II devastated Burma. Each time the region switched hands, the
retreating side intentionally destroyed capital, supplies, communications, and
transportation routes. Combat was heavy for an extended period of time, causing many
casualties. This devastation stoked nationalism; the Burmese had suffered tyranny from
two different empires and were sick of subjugation. Thus, quickly after the close of
World War II Burmese leaders actively resumed their push for independence.
Britain was also devastated by World War II; the war drained financial, military,
and industrial resources. Britain’s international power gave way to the United States’
economic and political hegemony. Her colonies had been decimated as battlefields, and
German air-raids had scorched London. What was left of Britain’s military machine now
needed to be restructured into peace-time production, and what limited resources
remained were needed for reconstruction at home.
Ultimately, the war depleted Britain’s ability and willpower to maintain its
empire. Clement Attlee and the Labour Party capitalized on this post-war sentiment to
seize a strong majority in parliament. The Labour government enacted a Keynesian
domestic policy. Attlee nationalized several industries, worked to stimulate the economy
10
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through government spending, and attempted to leverage the British currency until they
were restricted by the Bretton Woods system.11
The domestic policy demanded adjustments internationally. Britain needed money
and manpower back home. It also needed hard currency to exist in the new global
monetary regime. Thus, colonies that were once assets became liabilities. For example,
India—in addition to absorbing substantial manpower—was running a trade deficit with
the United States and bleeding dollars.12 The same was true of Burma and many other
colonies, though not all of them.
The Labour Government worked quickly toward independence in India, and the
momentum in India served as a catalyst for Burma’s progression. Burmese leaders used
as a foundation for their cause statements made in 1935 when Burma split from India
which contained promises that, “constitutional advance held out to Burma as part of
British India will not be prejudiced by this decision.”13 As India progressed toward
independence, Burmese leaders claimed they were promised that their process would
advance at the same speed.
The initial attempt at reconciling Burma was the Burma White Paper of May 17,
1945, put in effect under Churchill’s Conservative government. The plan would return
Burma to British rule for three years, during which time reconstruction would take place.
After that period, elections would be held, a constitution would be drafted, and Burma

11

Specifically, the anchoring of international currencies to the dollar, and the dollar to gold.
Cain, P.J. and A.G. Hopkins. British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914-1990. New York:
Longman Group LTD, 1993 (198).
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would gain Dominion Status in the Commonwealth of Nations.14 Burmese leaders were
adamantly opposed to this process, specifically its delay of independence and the
compulsion into Dominion Status.
The White Paper also appeared to enable an entrenchment of British interests in
Burma. As the British began reestablishing control, they returned land taken by the
Burmese during the war back to Indian landowners, established economic planning
boards dominated by European and Indian firms, and almost exclusively consulted
British businesses in decisions.15
Increasing Burmese pressure for independence compounded with the new Labour
government’s desire for quick progress, and promises were made in 1947 for
independence within a year.16 At that point, British involvement the specifics of
independence decreased, and the process accelerated. Churchill and the Conservative
party continued to push for a slower and more deliberate process, indicating that the
infrastructure and political climate were too unstable for independence and pushing
forward would lead to instability. But by 1947 the momentum was unstoppable and
resisting risked just as much if not more instability.17
General elections were held in April of 1947 for a Constituent Assembly that
would be responsible to form and gain support for a constitution. Aung San and the
AFPFL gained an overwhelming majority in the assembly. In July, Aung San and other

14

Dominion Status denotes a country that is free and autonomous, but still holds connections to Britain in
a global network called The Commonwealth of Nations, or The Commonwealth. Examples in the period
include Canada, Australia, and soon India.
15
Pluvier, Jan. South-East Asia: from Colonialism to Independence. London: Oxford University Press, 1974
(389).
16
Conclusions reached in the Conversations between His Majesty’s Government and the Delegation from
the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma, January 1947.
17
United Kingdom, House of Commons 1946, December 20, vol 431.
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leaders of the AFPFL were assassinated. Despite these assassinations, the constitution
was completed by the end of the year and official independence was declared on January
4, 1948.
While the history of Burma shows that the country’s independence process started
before World War II, the economic and political landscape in South East Asia and Britain
changed dramatically during the war. Thus, this paper will focus primarily on the postwar independence process (1945-1948), the context in which almost all major policy
decisions for Independence were formed.

III. Protection of Minorities
The history of Burma is one of consistent tension between ethnic groups. British
rule in many ways exacerbated these tensions, administering them all under one regime.
Some groups, like the Karen, were more loyal and supportive of British rule. As a result,
they were elevated and given privilege. For example, the British military and police force
in Burma was mostly Karen.
In January, 1947, a delegation from Burma met with British leaders in London to
establish expectations for Burma’s progression toward independence. Creating a policy
for the incorporation of ethnic minorities was one of the central points of discussion.
Both British and Burmese leaders agreed that incorporating The Frontier Areas with an
Independent Burma should be done with the consent of the peoples inhabiting those
areas.18 To accomplish this two actions were agreed upon: the Burmese delegation

18
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promised to hold a conference with minority leaders to gain their consent, and the British
declared that a committee of Burmese and minority leaders would be formed to ascertain
the best way to incorporate the groups into Independent Burma.

The Panglong Agreement
The Panglong Conference represents Aung San and the Burma Executive
Council’s efforts to obtain consent and support among ethnic minorities, and the resulting
document was the Panglong Agreement. The agreement was not permanent or official
legislation; rather, it was designed to begin unification during the interim period before
independence, enabling progression toward elections for the Constituent Assembly which
would then formalize cooperation and plans for long-term governance.
On February 12, 1947, Aung San gathered with representatives of the Kachins,
Shans, and Chins (notably, no Karen representatives took part in the proceedings) in
Panglong to discuss the future formation of independent Burma. At the conference, all
parties agreed that “freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins
and the Chins by their immediate co-operation with the Interim Burmese Government.”19
The minorities secured representation in the Executive Council of the interim
government, restrictions on the scope of the council’s power over the Frontier Areas, and
basic democratic rights and privileges. The document does not legislate or form separate
states for the Kachins, Shans, and Chins (or Karens), as it lacked the power to do so.
Instead, the parties agreed that separate states are desirable, and that Counsellors from the
Frontier Areas would be consulted in the interim administration of the region and

19

Panglong Agreement. February 12, 1947.
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represented in the Constituent Assembly. Notably, although there were Karen
representatives present at the conference, there were no Karen signatories.
The specifications and language in the Panglong Agreement indicate a willing but
cautious union, formed out of necessity rather than comradery. In the debates surrounding
the Burma Independence Bill, Parliamentary Member David Gammans asserted, “[The
Panglong Agreement] was negotiated by the frontier people in the knowledge that we
were going to sell out on them anyway, that we were prepared to abandon them, and that
they had better make peace with their adversary quickly.”20
In practice, the document solidified nothing, but it effectively ensured that any
future united Burma would be built on a Federalist system of ethnic states. It was also a
step toward establishing trust between Frontier Area leaders and Aung San. Most
importantly, it gave Burmese leaders a tangible indicator of unity to show the British,
which helped maintain a quick trajectory toward independence.
The British had a lukewarm response to the Panglong Agreement. While many
members of parliament emphasized the diplomatic progress the document represented,
others were wary of the limited Karen involvement21 and suspicious of Aung San and his
party.22 To them, the tone of the document seemed incongruous with the history of
violence and contempt that had existed between the groups up to that point.

20

United Kingdom, House of Commons 1947, November 5, Burma Independence Bill.
The Karen states de facto joined the Constituent Assembly months after the Panglong Agreement.
Referring to their eventual incorporation, PM Henry Raikes stated, “What else could they do? Our
Government have made it clear that we were clearing out, but no one in Burma imagines that the position
between the Karens and the Burmans will be either happy or pleasant for that very gallant minority”
(House of Commons 1947, November 5, Burma Independence Bill).
22
Of Aung San, Winston Churchill said, “Either he was a traitor to Burma when he helped the Japanese to
come in, or he was a traitor to the Japanese when he deserted them to join the British. We get him both
ways” (House of Commons 1947, November 5, Burma Independence Bill).
21
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Ultimately, Parliament was reluctant to rely solely on the Panglong Agreement for
evidence of harmony and consent in Burma.

The Frontier Areas Committee of Inquiry
To fulfill the second of the January 1947 agreements between the Burmese
delegation and the British, The Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry was formed to
ascertain “the best method of associating the Frontier peoples with the working out of the
new constitution for Burma.”23 The committee was composed of equal numbers of
Burmese and Frontier Areas people, appointed by the Burma Executive council and the
British Governor of Burma respectively.24 They traveled throughout the Frontier Areas,
interviewed individuals from each ethnic group, and compiled a report of minority
sentiment on the future of Burma.
Almost all recommendations provided by the Frontier Areas Report have
expression in the 1947 Constitution, indicating that British and Burmese policy did take
into account the desires of minority peoples. These accepted recommendations include a
federal government, a proposal for the geographic divisions of states, and expectations
for representation in parliament (the specifics of which will be discussed later). The
committee also recommended an interesting secession policy that was implemented in the
constitution. This clause allows any state in Burma to secede from the union after 10
years and with 2/3 support from that state’s legislature.
The secession clause is problematic in understanding British (and Burmese)
policy. On one hand, including it in the constitution shows that minority concerns were
23

Burma Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry Report, 1947. Available at The British Library: Asian and
African Studies, Kings Cross, London. Reference: IOR/M/4/2854.
24
Conclusions reached in the Conversations between His Majesty’s Government and the Delegation from
the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma, January 1947 (4.)
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considered in designing the government. On the other, it is glaring evidence that unity
had not been truly achieved with the Frontier Area peoples. It shows a tenuous and fragile
acceptance of plans for a unified Burma, which does fill the policy expectation for
gaining their consent, but also conveys anticipation of impending conflict and
disagreement.
The time constraint imposed at this point partially explains why this clause did
not spark concern and was accepted by the British as well as Aung San. Independence
had been promised within a year, and delay was no longer an option.25 Thus, the policy of
getting consent from the Frontier peoples was fulfilled. The principle behind it—
establishing a peaceful pluralistic nation—was not.

Foreshadowed Conflict
The frailty between the Burmese majority and other ethnic groups can be seen
clearly in an episode surrounding The Karen National Union. Saw M. Shwin, President of
the Shwegyin Karen Association, sent a letter to the Governor of Burma explaining that
the Karens “have a number of weapons that they used against the Japanese [during World
War II]” and that they “are not going to give up these arms […] to be left at the
mercilessness of the Burmese.”26 Shwin expressed his belief in Karen ability to maintain
law and order and their belief that the Burmese would move to disarm them and
subsequently subject them in the Union of Burma.
The British response to this episode again reveals a self-interest-based policy. In
discussing how to respond to this letter, the Governor’s office initially intended to ignore

25
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it—not because they didn’t care but because acknowledging they received it meant
informing the Burma Executive Council.27 This would give the council more reason to
push to remove those weapons, and the British didn’t necessarily want the Karens
disarmed in case the Burmese did unjustly try to marginalize them. The British called this
“a spikey” situation, and they hoped to approach it in a way favorable to the Karen
minority without upsetting the Burmese. (Governor’s Secretary’s Office No. 263).
Effectively, the British sidestepped getting involved in an almost certain ethnic conflict
directly while doing what they could to keep arms in the hands of the side they hoped
would win.
Another loaded statement by Sir Walter Fletcher in a House of Commons debate
suggests at least one contributing factor to the British policy toward the Burmese ethnic
groups. In discussing how to ensure Karen consent to the Panglong Agreement, he
encouraged the House to “bear in mind the exceptional services which they rendered
during the war in contrast with certain other people in Burma.”28 Fletcher is here alluding
to the actions of Aung San and other Burmese leaders now prominent in the AFPFL who
betrayed the British and renewed loyalty only after the tide of the war turned. This left
many British leaders with unfavorable views of the Burmese majority, including
Churchill who openly disliked and distrusted Aung San. In contrast, the Karen and other
minority groups in The Frontier Areas remained loyal to the British and actively
participated with British forces in maintaining and subsequently reclaiming Burma.29

27

British official to J. P. Gibson, July 17, 1947.
House of Commons, March 3, 1947.
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Thus, British concern for the minority groups can be understood as an effort to reward
loyalty.
History does not show the British actively ensuring a policy of minority
protection. While this does not necessarily prove the absence of those principles, it does
show their limits. The Burmese were constantly pressuring constitutional progress, and
parliament had committed to a deadline for independence in 1948. Delaying that process
threatened to bring unrest in Burma and further push them away from the British and
from democracy. The stated British policy clearly indicates a desire and intention to
protect minorities, if for no other reason than to repay loyalty. However, the enacted
policy, and the institutions created show a superficial effort to ensure that protections
were in place and would be effective. The British resolve to create institutions that would
guarantee that protection was overcome by other pressures.

IV. Majoritarian Democracy
The Westminster model of democracy follows a majoritarian system. This system
operates under the belief that rule by a majority is the most effective way to operate a
democracy. At the center of this structure is a first-past-the-post electoral system, where
each individual can vote for only one individual for a given position, and the candidate
who receives the highest number of votes is elected.30 This is also described as a “winner
takes all” system.

30

This does not require the candidate to have a majority (over 50%) of the votes. In a situation with more
than two candidates, the winner only needs to have the highest percentage of votes.
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The British government nuances pure majoritarian democracy by having a
bicameral system with an upper and lower house—the House of Lords and House of
Commons respectively—with the House of Lords consisting of appointed members not
subject to a general election. However, the House of Lords is extremely limited in its
powers and in the 20th century was effectively only able to stall, not veto, legislation
introduced in the House of Commons. Thus, the British government still embodies a
majoritarian system.
The independence process in Burma shows that the British did not have a policy
of imposing their conception of majoritarian democracy. However, their number one
priority in every aspect of policy was the establishment of some form of democracy. A
statement of policy made in May 1945 sheds light on British priorities:
“the ultimate objective of His Majesty’s Government will be that representatives
of the Burmese people, after reaching a sufficient measure of agreement between
the various parties and sections, should draw up a Constitution of a type which
they themselves consider most suitable for Burma, taking into account not only
the British but the other various types of constitution in democratically governed
countries”31
This approach to establishing democracy by allowing the people to form their own
constitution resembles a policy of self-determination. However, British documents and
records of parliamentary debates show that it was more of a “democracy or bust” policy
than any attachment to specific institutions or underlying benevolence toward the
Burmese. The threat of communism made the differences between democracies minute;
preserving a democratic country in Southeast Asia was worth minor concessions.

31
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The following specific diversions from the British form of majoritarian
government are worth noting. They provide evidence that the British had limited
commitment to majoritarian principles and show how the Burmese constitution was
formed (by the Burmese) to accommodate their specific needs.

Federalism
Because a majoritarian government asserts that the best method of democratic
governance is by pure majority, it necessarily calls for a unitary system. Having federalist
subdivisions spoils rule of majority at a national level. The Burmese completely depart
from the British unitary example by establishing a federal system. Historically the region
of Burma had been loosely connected under kingdoms generally based in the Irrawaddy
valley; the frontier area regions were normally tributaries to the central kingdom and
indirectly ruled. Under British rule, the colony of Burma was administered through
separated states. Some regions, specifically in parts of the northern Frontier Areas, were
never formally administered by the British. Thus, federalism was a much more organic
choice for administration than a unitary government. The Frontier Areas Committee of
Enquiry report indicates British, Burmese, and ethnic minority support for federalism.32
The Panglong Agreement also indicated Burmese desire to establish states within
the Union of Burma, promising “full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier
Areas.”33 The Frontier Area states were less-developed than Burma proper, and thus they
acknowledged the importance of continued ties with either Britain or Burma.34 However,
they were suspicious of the Burmese commitment to the best interests of their ethnic

32
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groups. A federalist arrangement was intended to allow these states to align themselves
with the Burmese while maintaining a level of autonomy and gaining a check on the
federal government.35

Legislature
Burma adopted a bi-cameral legislature consisting of the Chamber of Deputies
and the Chamber of Nationalities. The Chamber of Deputies is composed of members
selected to represent constituencies. In this regard, it mirrors the United States House of
Representatives more than any British legislative body, with each member representing a
constituency of between 30,000 to 100,000 constituents. The Chamber of Nationalities is
designed to ensure representation for all of the minority states. The allocation of seats
ensures a specific number of seats for each state, based loosely on the state’s population.
Unlike the British relationship between the House of Lords and the House of Commons,
both houses in Burma have significant power in introducing, debating, and vetoing
legislation.
The Chamber of Nationalities was a crucial component in securing ethnic
minority support for the constitution. The reserved seats for members from each state
provided a check on the Burmese majority, without which Burmans would easily
command the votes needed for any legislation of their choosing. This arrangement
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complemented the establishment of states and federalism by adding influence in the
federal government, not just at the state level.
The British had relatively little to say on the form of the legislature. The Frontier
Areas Committee Report indicates that they were consciously ascertaining the interests of
the minorities and this conception aligned with that goal, but the idea originated with the
Burma Constituent Assembly, not British Parliament.
Despite the British desire to protect and represent minorities, the systems created
for their protection were flawed. Lord Rankeillour enumerated several of these flaws in
the House of Lords:
“Under Chapter XI the whole Constitution may be changed by a two-thirds vote
of the two Chambers of Parliament, and it would seem from the figures available
that the Burmans could always command such a two-thirds majority. […] It is
quite true that the special rights of the Karens or Chins shall be safeguarded under
Clause 209, but these special rights appear only to relate to semi-autonomous
solid blocks of these races in the North and not to the general rights of a mixed
population in the greater part of the country.”36
Thus, while Federalism and the Chamber of Nationalities both worked to ensure
representation, autonomy, and protection for The Frontier Areas, their conception in the
constitution was inadequate to effectively ensure these protections were impactful or
lasting.
Like minority protections, we again see the British expressing a policy regarding
the creation of democracy with a lack of involvement on designing and perfecting the
institutions created. If the British were genuinely concerned with creating an effective
government, issues like the one observed by Lord Rankeillour would have prompted a
delay in independence until they were ironed out. No delay occurred.
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This could be construed as a policy of self-determination; the British do express
their desire for the Burmese to design their own constitution. Thus, their lack of
involvement may have been deliberate. However, that does not completely explain
British actions. The next section will discuss alternative possibilities that more
comprehensively explain why the British followed a non-intervention policy in many of
these decisions.

V. Strategic Self-Interests and Stability
Cutting Burma from the British empire was in the best interests of both Britain
and Burma; the former lacked the resources and willpower to sustain rule and the latter
craved independence free from any meddling empire. The rate at which independence
was obtained and Burma’s departure from the commonwealth can be traced back to
British self-interests and efforts to maintain stability and influence in the region.
The British, according to a statement of policy issued by H.M.G. in May of 1945,
initially desired a level of reconstruction before independence. Referring to Burma’s
economic and social foundations, the British claimed, “it is, of course, upon these
foundations that a political structure rests, and until the foundations are once again firm
the political institutions which were in operation before the Japanese invasion cannot be
restored.” Issues this document cites include: population upheaval necessitating the need
to revise electoral roles, restoration of communications to enable a general election,
restoration of buildings and public utilities, rehabilitation of agriculture and other
essential industries. “Till this is done, conditions are lacking in which the requirements of
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a democratic system of government can be met.”37 Over the next two years, British and
Burmese leaders made progress toward these reconstruction goals; the Burma Executive
council was established as an interim administration, and funds were allocated for public
projects.
Two months after the May 1945 statement, Clement Attlee and the Labour party
assumed control of British Parliament. Their statement of policy was a bit different. Their
intentions were still to aid in reconstruction, but much more emphasis was made on
moving to self-government as quickly as possible. A speech stating their policy says that
Colonies pursuing independence “shall go as fast as they show themselves capable of
going.”38
Churchill and the Opposition resented and opposed this emphasis on speed. In
December of 1946, Churchill said in Parliament:
“it is less than a year since the Japanese were expelled or destroyed. There have
been no adequate elections, no representative assembly formed, and nothing that
could be said to be a representative or settled view of the people there. […] Yet
we are told that we must accelerate the process of our departure as much as
possible […] This haste is appalling. “Scuttle” is the only word that can be
applied. What, spread over a number of years, would be a healthy and
constitutional process and might easily have given the Burmese people an
opportunity of continuing their association with our congregation of nations, has
been cast aside.”39
However, it appears at this point momentum was unstoppable. PM Thomas Reed
responded in the same debate:
“In my opinion, if we try to delay constitutional reform, that is the very best way
of creating disorder. The Burmese intelligentsia are determined to push forward
towards independence, and it is quite in vain for us to put obstacles in their way at
this stage.”40
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Thus, the British did not necessarily abandon the good intentions of reconstruction and
aid before independence. Even after independence the British promised to deliver funds
for reparations. However, debates do indicate that the acceleration of independence—not
just for Burma but for India and other Colonies—was a politically charged, partisan
decision made by the Labour Party.
The quick departure from Burma also lines up with an adjustment in domestic
policy. Keynesian economic theory underpinned Prime Minister Attlee’s plans for postwar reconstruction in Britain. Attlee and his Labour government nationalized several
industries, increased government spending, and ultimately had in their sites a robust
welfare state.41 To enact this policy, Britain needed to increase government spending
specifically within Britain, not the colonies, in order to put money into the hands of
workers within Britain. Additionally, under the Bretton Woods system, Britain needed
hard currency; colonies in South Asia were running a trade deficit with the USA,
reducing the availability of currency within the empire.42 Letting go of Burma seemed
like a net positive.
The British may have also wanted to leave Burma quickly because of signs that
the situation would soon get further out of hand. The letter from Saw M. Shwin, cited
earlier, foretold armed conflict and resistance. The assassination of Aung San was
another huge indicator or political unrest. Furthermore, British experience in other
colonies—India being a close example—gave the British ample evidence of the issues
surrounding independence. Contemporary to the Burma independence process, the
41
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British were sorting out the partition of India and Pakistan. In that case, the British chose
to separate ethnic groups into independent countries, sparking extremely violent conflicts
and a huge refugee crisis.
Burma’s moment of independence resembled India and Pakistan; ethnic and
religious diversity was divisive and the Karen minority, like the Pakistani Muslims,
wanted a separate state.43 The British moved forward with the opposite policy in Burma,
requiring a united Burma, but had ample reason to anticipate a similar outcome. The
British had hope for a successful future in Burma, but the evidence available gave them
reason to expect the worst, and motivation to get out quickly.
Allowing Burma to not only be independent but to also leave the Commonwealth
may have ultimately been in Britain’s best interests. Thakin Nu had suggested to British
leaders that a push by AFPFL for Burma to accept independence would result in the
downfall of the party and turn the country to communist influences.44 The AFPFL was by
far the party that lined up closest with British goals for the region, so preserving their
preeminence in Burma was advantageous. Above all else, Britain wanted a democratic
government installed in Burma. Communism was emerging throughout Asia and as the
Cold War approached, maintaining territory for the democratic world was seen as critical.
Although keeping Burma in the Commonwealth was another top priority, the British
were willing to sacrifice that goal if it meant ensuring democracy.
British leaders also realized in Burma the shortcomings of Dominion status and
Commonwealth relations. They believed, or at least suggested, that Dominion status was
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equal to independence with the additional benefits of strong ties to the rest of the
Commonwealth and British protection. This concept did not translate well; the Burmese
saw Dominion status as continued subjugation by the British and felt true independence
required departure from the Commonwealth.45 Hubert Rance, Governor of Burma prior to
Independence, discussed these shortcomings and concerns surrounding them in a
telegram to William Hare:
“I feel that the example of Burma in leaving the Commonwealth may well be
followed by other subject countries treading the path of political development.
There is a natural psychological urge in such countries to demonstrate their
independence and political adulthood. […] If it is declared to the world by the
case of Burma that there are only two choices—within the Commonwealth on
Commonwealth terms particularly where one of these is allegiance to the King or
outside on their own it may well be that opinion will harden. The Leftist trend in
Burma is I believe common to all Eastern countries now rising to nationhood and
with humble respect to His Majesty allegiance to the King may prove not
immediately but ultimately a difficulty. The conclusion I reach therefore is that
the time seems ripe for a new conception of association within the
Commonwealth not necessarily owing allegiance to the Crown especially for
those countries which have no ties of blood culture or religion. […] In my opinion
it is a question not only whether H.M.G. has a dynamic policy for S.E.A.
[Southeast Asia] but whether H.M.G. can produce a new conception of
Commonwealth to meet new conditions.”46
To Rance, Burma marked a turning point in the British Empire. At the height of their
power, it was absurd to think any colony would want to completely sever ties with
Britain; they had too much to lose. After World War II, allegiance with the British was
not as vital. This diminished value, combined with a rise of nationalism throughout the
world and especially in Asia, required British adaptation. The rhetoric of Dominion status
as a privileged membership had to be modified, and relations with the Crown made less
explicit.
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VI. Conclusion
A propaganda strategy memo drafted by Guy Wint in 1944, before Britain had
even regained Burma, provides a resonant comment on British policy in Asia. In context
of expressing the desire and potential for a reincorporation of Burma into the empire,
Wint cites lack of a clear policy as one of the largest obstacles.
“The British Empire […] fails to suggest to its Asiatic subjects any simple and
clear-cut principles. It is a vast political structure, still with great strength […] but
for the present lacking the vital fluid of exciting ideas uniform throughout its
parts. It stood for such ideas in the past, but these have become old-fashioned,
have lost their vigour, or been discredited, and no clear new ideas have replaced
them. […] The sapping power of stimulating new ideas from outside against an
Empire whose central concepts are an enigma, and which has failed to reconcile
to itself the nationalist movements within its own body, may cause a gradual but
unarrestable crumbling into ruin of the British Asiatic Empire.”47
Wint’s prediction was fulfilled; a concrete policy was never established, and within 5
years every colony on the Bay of Bengal left the empire.
Wint also hypothesizes why a policy was never formed. He writes, “The structure
of this Empire has never been deliberately designed. Its development has been shaped
and determined by forces working within the British people and within the peoples of the
other countries of which the Empire is composed.”48 This pattern holds in the Burma
independence process; no deliberate policy was followed.
However, that is not necessarily a negative reflection on British intentions. The
events in Burma do not give much evidence for a comprehensive British policy, but they
do highlight several fundamental principles and the relative importance the British gave
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to them. They took a devolutionary approach to independence, encouraging the Burmese
to look to western democracies as examples but conceive their constitution themselves.
The British were adamant that democracy be established in a union supported by
and protecting all ethnic minority groups but showed much less concern about the
specifics of how that goal would be achieved. Self-interests ultimately dictated policy,
and as maintaining Burma as a colony became burdensome and problematic ties were
more readily and quickly cut.
This paper has discussed several motivations behind British policy and
investigated how their actions compare with their proposed goals and ideals. Evidence
indicates that the British did genuinely care for minority groups, although that care was
motivated in part to repay loyalty during World War II. The British did little to impose
majoritarian principles, and several institutions created in the Constitution show
significant deviations from the British pattern of democracy. Their lack of concern here
may have been less an abandonment of those principles and instead a prioritization of
other needs. Ultimately the British appear to have acted in their own best interests,
preserving resources, exiting quickly, and avoiding conflict.
A consistent policy throughout the Burma independence process was the
establishment of democracy. The British determination to see democracy established is
evidenced by their concessions in particulars including the form of democracy and the
timeline of independence. The British were even willing to let go of the concept of The
Commonwealth (at least with Burma) in order to lock in a democracy in Southeast Asia.
Fear of losing democracy in Burma was one of the most powerful catalysts in the
relaxations of other less-important policies.
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This analysis of British policy in Burma does not provide a comprehensive view
of British policy in decolonization. However, the patterns of limited concern for
minorities, a devolutionary approach to constitutional design, and prioritizing self-interest
do seem to be fairly consistent. Preliminary research conducted by other individuals in
association with this paper has found similar patterns in the independence processes of
several other colonies.49 The next step in understanding British policy should be a study
of consistencies and differences in each independence process.
At least with the Burma independence process, it appears that despite
consistencies in general patterns, most of British colonial policy is situational, dictated by
the economic and political environment at the time of independence, and the strategic
relationship with the colony. This thesis suggests that while there may be consistencies in
underlying British policy, situational constraints reveal limitations of commitment to
these policies, and a gap between rhetoric and actions.
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